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The rise of the global civil society in the 1990s andthe emergence of an increasingly global economy re-flect a new system of power distribution in the inter-
national political order. “Civil society organisations”
(CSOs) are organisations that originate outside the state ap-
paratus and business, and include those that are more widely
known as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In
1996, the United Nations outlined its formal association
with civil society organisations in an Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) resolution by establishing accredita-
tion procedures through the Committee on Non-Govern-
mental Organisations.((2) Today, non-governmental organisa-
tions can apply for general consultative status and be accred-
ited to take active part in UN conferences and sum-
mits. While only 714 organisations were accredited to
ECOSOC in 1992,((3) today the number stands at 3,051.((4)
China’s  r egulatory framework  for CSOs
Mirroring the global scene, there has been a proliferation of
CSOs, including NGOs, charities, foundations, advocacy
groups and professional associations, in China within the past
decade.((5) Official Chinese figures from 1989 in the early
days of its statistical record keeping on these organisations
placed the number at slightly over 200,000,((6) while the
2006 statistics counted 354,000 CSOs.((7) However, due to
restrictive registration policies, scholars estimate that the
number of CSOs in 2006 actually exceeded 3 million.((8)
This wide gap between official and unofficial numbers stems
in part from the fact that China lacks a clear regulatory frame-
work governing the definition and operation of CSOs. For in-
stance, terminologies on how various CSOs are officially clas-
sified versus how they are commonly referred to are confusing
and, at times, overlapping. In addition, the term “non-profit or-
ganisation” (NPO) has recently become another common
and more favourable reference for civil society in China, given
the non-profit nature of CSOs that is required by law. How-
ever, both terms NGO and NPO, though often colloquially
used to refer to China’s civil society, lack official definitions
and are outside China’s regulatory regime.
This article provides an overview of domestic civil society or-
ganisations in China and the regulations that govern and af-
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The rise of civil society organisations is a global phenomenon that started after the end of the Cold War, and China also
has recently seen an increase of these organisations that work on a diverse range of issues inside the country. This article
provides an overview of domestic regulations that govern the work of these organisations in China, and discusses how
these regulations and measures used to control their operations affect the development of a genuine open and transparent
civil society space in China. 
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fect their work. It examines the various layers of regulatory
control that are used to limit the activities of Chinese CSOs
beyond government-sanctioned activities. As a whole, these
imposed tactics obstruct the development of civil society as
a meaningful venue for participatory and inclusive political
and social dialogue that could mediate tensions and address
grievances in society, and in so doing, contribute to a gen-
uine harmonious society in China.Overv iew of  Civ il  Soc iety  in  China
In China, the fundamental aspects of CSOs, literally trans-
lated as Minjian zuzhi 民间组织 are not well understood,
given the complex and often repressive regulatory regime that
restricts their work. Several key regulations issued since 1998
have attempted to officially classify all CSOs into the three
main categories of social organisations, foundations and popu-
lar non-enterprise work units (PNEWUs).((9) The legal defini-
tions for these categories are:
• Social organisations or SOs (Shehui tuanti
社会团体社团, She tuan 社团)—“voluntary groups
formed by Chinese citizens in order to realise a shared ob-
jective, according to their rules and to develop non–profit-
making activities.”((10)
• Foundations (Jijinhui基金会)—“non-profit legal entities
established in accordance with these regulations that em-
ploy assets donated by actual persons, legal entities or
other organisations for the purpose of engaging in some
public benefit enterprise.”((11)
• Popular non-enterprise work units or PNEWUs (minban
feiqiye danwei 民办非企业单位 or private and non-
commercial entities)—“social organisations carrying out
social service activities of a non-profit nature, run by en-
terprises and institutional work units, social groups and
other social forces, and also individual citizens using non-
state assets.”((12)
Different English translations exist for the type of organisa-
tions known as popular non-enterprise work units (minban
feiqiye danwei民办非企业单位), such as “popular non-
enterprise work units,” “private non-enterprise work units,”
“private NPOs” and “non-governmental, non-commercial
enterprises”—thus adding another layer of confusion when
discussing civil society in China. This article uses the trans-
lation “popular non-enterprise work units,” as it more closely
reflects the original terminology in Chinese.
As of the end of 2006, there were approximately 354,000
registered CSOs throughout China. Of those, approxi-
mately 192,000 were social organisations; 1,144 were foun-
dations; and about 161,000 were PNEWUs.((13)
What is  an  NGO in  China?
In addition to these various definitions of the different cate-
gories, some fundamental conceptual problems remain.
There is still a lack of clarity on NGOs in China because
the terminology is referenced in neither legal nor official
documents. For example, what are seen as home-grown Chi-
nese NGOs are usually registered as social organisa-
tions. Some of these organisations have management struc-
tures that are appointed by the government, leading them to
be labelled as GONGOs, a somewhat contradictory term
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5. Wu Zongzhi, “NGOs—Providing A Link,” Beijing Review, 26 May 2005,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/En-2005/05-26-e/china-1.htm. See also Lin Lihong,
Minjian zuzhi dengji zhi falu wenti yanjiu (A Study of Legal Issues on the Registration of
Civil Society Organisations), Hubei Social Sciences, no. 2, 2005, available at
http://www.chinahexie.org/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=2923 and http://www.china
hexie.org/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=2924. 
6. Li Xiaoyun et al., “Operation and Accountability of the CSOs in China,” Action Aid China
Office, 6, 2006, http://www.governancelink.org/IssueNo1Apr07/CSOaccountabilityin
China.pdf. This 1989 number, however, only refers to social organisations, and it is not
clear whether the two other CSO categories of foundations and popular non-enterprise
work units are also included in this count due to the ambiguity in the classification sys-
tem as discussed in the article.
7. 2006 nian minzheng shiye fazhan tongji baogao (The 2006 Report on Civil Affairs
Development and Statistics), Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
2006, http://www.mca.gov.cn/news/content/recent/2007523122309.htm. This figure,
however, is a rounded number. The precise number of registered civil society organisa-
tions in China in 2006 is 354,393, according to 2006 niandu minjian zuzhi tongji shuju
(Summary of Statistics of Civil Society Organisations in 2006), China Civil Society
Organisations Website hosted by the Bureau of NGO Administration under the Ministry
of Civil Affairs, http://www.chinanpo.gov.cn/web/showBulltetin.do?id=27550&
dictionid=2201.
8. Li Xiaoyun et al., op. cit. 
9. Shehui tuanti dengji guanli tiaoli (Regulations for the Registration and Management of
Social Organisations, hereinafter Social Organisations Regulations), 1998; Jijinhui guan-
li tiaoli (Regulations for the Management of Foundations, hereinafter Foundations
Regulations), 2004; and Minban feiqiye danwei dengji guanli zanxing tiaoli (Provisional
Regulations for the Registration and Management of Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units,
hereinafter Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units Provisional Regulations), 1998.
10. Social Organisations Regulations, art. 2. An unofficial English translation of the regula-
tions is available on the website of the China Development Brief,
http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/298.
11. Foundations Regulations, art. 2. An unofficial English translation of the regulations is
available on the website of the China Development Brief, http://www.china
developmentbrief.com/node/301. 
12. Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units Provisional Regulations, art. 2. An unofficial English
translation of the provisional regulations is available on the website of the China
Development Brief, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/300.
13. “The 2006 Report on Civil Affairs Development and Statistics,” op. cit. The precise num-
ber for registered social organisations is 191,946 in 2006, while it stands at 161,303 for
registered PNEWUs, according to “Summary of Statistics of Civil Society Organisations
in 2006,” op. cit.
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meaning “government organised non-governmental organisa-
tions.” Organisations that do not register are considered to
be operating illegally and risk being closed down by the au-
thorities. Some critics have even argued that home-grown
NGOs do not exist in China, due to the fact that such or-
ganisations must be first registered and sponsored by a rele-
vant government department or authority that oversees the
organisations’ activities—thus making all NGOs virtually de-
pendent on government for their registration and continued
survival.
Nevertheless, the term NGO is used by the media, acade-
mia and people who work with such organisations in China
as a loose and generic reference to all the different types of
social organisations in China. However, the government and
some NGOs often prefer to use the broader designation of
CSOs to deflect attention away from their supposedly “non-
government” nature and skirt the sensitive question of their
funding.((14) The label of NGOs is, therefore, used alongside
the three official designations and often is meant to include
both registered and unregistered organisations that are not
captured by official statistics.
Over laps  and ambiguit ies
Despite these classifications, in practice there is a consider-
able amount of overlap between the different types of organ-
isations. The government sometimes uses these terms dis-
tinctly, while at other times assigns certain organisations to
more than one classification. For example, according to the
Provisional Regulations for the Registration and Manage-
ment of Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units, a social organ-
isation is also a sub-group of PNEWU,((15) despite the fact
that there are two separate regulations governing their regis-
tration. The regulatory framework also lacks a clear, official
explanation of all the different categories. All these factors,
along with the ambiguous definitions and application of clas-
sifications, contribute to the confusing nature of the topic of
civil society in China. These factors all hinder an accurate
discussion on how these organisations are controlled by the
authorities through a variety of regulatory barriers to limit
their effectiveness.Controls  and Limits  
There are a number of functional barriers to limit the entry
and operation of CSOs in China. The overall effect of such
policies is that the civil space where these organisations can
carry out their work can be arbitrarily curtailed by the gov-
ernment. These barriers, therefore, serve as overall control
on the emergence of the civil society that could challenge
state policies.
Control  o f  entry
The first level of control is exercised at the entry level. To
achieve legal status, China’s CSOs must first acquire ap-
proval and sponsorship from a Party or government depart-
ment or state-affiliated organisation that works on a related
subject. The group must then apply for registration to the
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MOCA),((16) which only allows
one social organisation with the same mandate in each ad-
ministrative area.((17) In this way, not all groups manage to se-
cure sponsorship, especially those that advocate issues that
are deemed too politically sensitive by the government.
The registration requirement is an opportunity for the Chinese
bureaucracy to prevent the establishment of problematic
groups. A prominent local HIV/AIDS-awareness group called
the Beijing Aizhixing Institute of Health Education (Beijing
Aizhixing Jiankang Jiaoyu Yanjiusuo
北京爱知行健康教育研究所) was ordered to change its
name when it applied to register as a social organisation with
the MOCA.((18) The order followed the release of a report by
the Aizhixing Institute critical of the ways that the Chinese
government was proposing to use foreign funding for
HIV/AIDS programmes.((19) However, the organisation was
officially told that the name had been taken so it should choose
a new one or close down operations. This demonstrates how
the Chinese bureaucracy often functions in such a way as to
prevent groups that it dislikes from operating legally as a regis-
tered CSO. In the end, the organisation renamed itself the
Beijing Zhiaixing Information and Counselling Centre.((20)
Many CSOs choose to avoid the bureaucracy all together by
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14. See also Andreas Edele, “Report: Non-Governmental Organisations in China,” Center for
Applied Studies in International Negotiations, May 2005, http://www.casin.ch/
web/pdf/chinafinal.pdf.
15. Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units Provisional Regulations, art. 2.
16. Social Organisations Regulations, art. 6, Foundation Regulations, art. 6, and Popular
Non-enterprise Work Units Provisional Regulations, art. 5.
17. Social Organisations Regulations, art. 13.
18. “Aids Group Told to Change Name or Close,” South China Morning Post, 24 March 2005.
When the group attempted to obtain a business registration with the State Administration
for Industry and Commerce, they were also told that “Health Education” from its title was
not the name of an industry and thus not in line with the naming regulation. 
19. “Chinese Authorities Threaten to Shut NGO After it Releases Report Criticising AIDS
Projects (updated 3/30),” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 5 April 2005,
http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.phpd?showsingle=9217.
20. Ibid.
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operating under non-CSO status or even without registra-
tion. Some register themselves as businesses, even though
this obliges them to pay corporate taxes. According to the
NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua University, it is esti-
mated that as many as 150,000 groups are registered as
companies or as research institutes, so as to avoid the bu-
reaucracy of finding government sponsors for CSOs.((21)
Other CSOs may opt to operate without registration despite
the fact that local MOCA branches have the authority to
close down CSOs found to be operating without the proper
registration licence in their localities. In addition, without
legal status, the organisation cannot borrow money from the
bank or enter into contracts. “Because we can’t have a bank
account, it becomes very difficult to raise funds,” said one
Mr. Ren, who tried to form an outreach group in Xian for
HIV positive patients, when he failed to find a local govern-
ment department to sponsor the organisation.((22) In this way,
the registration requirement represents another operational
hurdle for those organisations that choose to work outside
the strict regulatory framework and in the grey zone of tech-
nical illegality.
Contro l  through annual revi ews
CSOs that have been accredited must face MOCA’s annual
renewal process. All CSOs must submit a report to their
sponsor organisation for annual review, and such reports will
then be sent to MOCA. Officials from the sponsoring gov-
ernment organisation and MOCA may conduct the annual
review in person and may request additional information if
necessary. As a result of the annual review, MOCA may
renew, suspend or revoke a CSO’s registration licence.((23)
There are also additional specific measures on the annual re-
view process for the different types of CSOs. For example,
foundations must post their approved annual review reports
at officially designated media outlets and are further subject
to monitoring and questions from members of the general
public.((24)
Contro l  of  operational  independence  
Chinese CSOs are urged by the Chinese government to es-
tablish internal Party organisations (Ying jianli dang zuzhi
应建立党组织) if three or more of its employees are
CPC members.((25) This allows for Party influence and inter-
vention in the daily operation and activities of the organisa-
tion. By 2006, out of the total number of registered CSOs
in China that were required to establish internal Party organ-
isations, about half had already done so. The breakdown of
those organisations that have established internal Party or-
ganisations in the three different CSO categories is as fol-
lows: 49.7% of SOs, 66.7% of foundations and 50.6% of
PNEWUs.((26)
Many CSOs, especially development CSOs, do have close
relations with the government, which enables them to receive
international aid more easily or to have more international co-
operation in their areas of work. This is particularly because
there are many restrictions on CSOs’ ability to raise funds
from private sources. The new law on anti-money laundering
promulgated in October 2006 has put up additional barriers
that prevent small, grassroots CSOs from receiving funds do-
mestically and abroad.((27) According to the law, financial in-
stitutions are required to report any large amount transaction
of 200,000 yuan or above to anti-money laundering authori-
ties.((28) Different kinds of CSOs also have different funding
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21. “Helping Hands,” Time, 1 March 2004, http://www.time.com/time/asia/2004/
china_reform/china_socialwork.html.
22. Howard W. French, “Citizens’ Groups Take Root Across China,” New York Times, 15
February 2007.
23. See Ministry of Civil Affairs, Shehui tuanti niandu jiancha zanxing banfa (Provisional
Measures on Annual Review for Social Organisations), 2005; Ministry of Civil Affairs,
Jijinhui niandu jiancha banfa (Measures on Annual Review for Foundations), 2005; and
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Minban feiqiye danwei niandu jiancha banfa (Measures on
Annual Review for Popular Non-Enterprises Work Units Organisations), 2005.
24. Measures on Annual Review for Foundations, art. 12.
25. Communist Party of China and the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Zhonggong zhongyang
zuzhibu, minzhengbu guanyu zai shehui tuanti zhong jianli dangzuzhi youguan wenti de
tongzhi (Notice Regarding Establishing Party Organisation in Social Organisations),
1998. Full text in Chinese is available at http://www.mca.gov.cn/wjylzx/detail.asp?id=
3230&keyword. Although no such specific notices separately exist for foundations and
PNEWUs, some reports appear to interpret that PNEWUs fall under the ambit of the
Notice Regarding Establishing Party Organisation in Social Organisations. See Zai min-
jian zuzhi zhong yao jianli dang de zuzhi, jieshou dang de lingdao. Dan ruguo moxie min-
ban feiqiye danwei zhong dangyuan renshu buzu san ren zenme ban? (Civil Society
Organisations Need to Establish Internal Party Organisations and Accept Party
Leadership; But What Can be Done if Some Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units do not
Meet the Minimum Three Party Member Requirement?), website of the Ninghai County
Government (www.NH.gov.cn), 2 September 2003 (re-posted on 17 July 2006),
http://www.nh.gov.cn/005/001/012/003/1011524.html. This reiterates the observation
made in the article that the categorisations of the different CSOs in China often overlap
and, therefore, contribute to ambiguity and confusion as to how these organisations are
regulated by the government.
26. Percentages are calculated from the numbers contained in “Summary of Statistics of
Civil Society Organisations in 2006,” op. cit. For social organisations, 25,384 out of
51,037 (49.7%) have internal party organisations; for foundations, 303 out of 454
(66.7%); and for PNEWUs, 14,877 out of 29,412 (50.6%). The total percentage was cal-
culated as 50.1% (40,564 out of 80,903).
27. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo fan xi qian fa (Anti-Money Laundering Law of the People’s
Republic of China), adopted on 31 October 2006 and came into effect on 1 January
2007. Full text in Chinese is available at http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-10/31/con-
tent_429245.htm.
28. “Jinrongye jiti fengshe xiheiqian geren zunkuan ershi wan keneng bei jilu” (“Financial
Institutions Required to Report Cash Deposit over 200,000 Yuan As Government Beefs
up Anti-Money Laundering Efforts”), Xinhuanet, 30 December 2006,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-12/30/content_5549547.htm.
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requirements for operating at the national and local levels.((29)
Although a 1999 law makes charitable donations tax de-
ductible, the law is vague and difficult to implement.((30)
Control  o f  info rmat ion and advocacy
Much of the information that CSOs seek and need for their
work comes within the scope of state secrets laws and regu-
lations, which are poorly defined and overly broad. Informa-
tion as diverse as the total number of laid-off workers in
state-owned enterprises; statistics on unusual deaths in pris-
ons, juvenile detention facilities and re-education-through-
labour facilities; and data on water and solid waste are clas-
sified as state secrets. The system then allows for those indi-
viduals in possession of this information to be charged with
state secrets crimes. China’s state secrets system, therefore,
provides the government with an effective tool to control in-
formation and prohibit individuals and groups from working
on sensitive issues by allowing the very information that
CSOs often deal with to be labelled as state secrets.((31)
For example, in August 2002, Wan Yanhai万延海, a doc-
tor and HIV/AIDS activist, was detained on suspicion of
“leaking state secrets” for publishing a document on the in-
ternet detailing deaths from AIDS in Henan Province as re-
sult of government-sanctioned blood-selling centres.((32) More
recently, in October 2005, Tan Kai 谭凯, founder of the
grassroots environmental group Green Watch based in
Hangzhou, was detained together with five other founding
members by local authorities. Their detention was believed
to be in relation to their monitoring of the situation in
Huashui Town in Dongyang City, Zhejiang Province in
April 2005 following local complaints that pollution from a
chemical factory was destroying crops and causing birth de-
fects. In May 2006, Tan Kai was sentenced to 18 months’
imprisonment for “illegally obtaining state secrets.”((33)
Various state secrets regulations also indicate which social
groups the Chinese authorities are concerned about and,
correspondingly, to what extent they are willing to utilise
state secrets protection to suppress them. Independent polit-
ical groups, illegal religious activities, illegal publications and
the activities of illegal organisations are at the heart of offi-
cial preoccupation with potential dissent. These groups in-
clude “domestic and international hostile organisations or
movements,” “minority splittist organisations,” “hostile reli-
gious organisations” and “reactionary sects.”((34)
The open dissemination and publication of information is a
critical tool for lawyers, journalists, human rights defenders
and other civil society actors to spread awareness, educate
the public and advocate issues that affect them. The impact
of the state secrets system in China is to undercut that open-
ness and participation and discourage the transfer of, or ac-
cess to, information and ideas. Many of these citizen advo-
cates have been detained and harassed by authorities be-
cause they raise issues that are considered sensitive by the
government.
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29. See Social Organisations Regulations, Art. 10(5) and Foundations Regulations, art. 8(2).
Although the Popular Non-Enterprise Work Units Provisional Regulations do not have a
similar general provision on operation funding requirements, sector-specific funding
requirements do apply. For example, a PNEWU in the science/technology category must
have at least 10,000 yuan to be registered as an individual PNEWU, 30,000 yuan as a
partnership, or 50,000 yuan as a legal entity. See Ministry of Science Technology and
Ministry of Civil Affairs, Kejilei minban feiqiye danwei dengji shencha yu guanli zanxing
banfa (Measures on Registration and Management on Science/Technology-Related
Popular Non-Enterprises Work Units), 2005.
30. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo gongyi shiye juanzeng fa (Public Welfare Law of the
People’s Republic of China), adopted on 28 June 1999 and came into effect on 1
September 1999. Full text in Chinese is available at http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-
10/01/content_74087.htm.
31. For more information on China’s state secrets system, please see “State Secrets:
China’s Legal Labyrinth,” Human Rights in China, June 2007, http://hrichina.org/
public/contents/41421.
32. “State Control of the Internet in China,” Amnesty International, November 2002,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA170072002?open&of=ENG-CHN.
33. Huanbao renshi Tan Kai bei pan yinian ban xingqi (Environmentalist Tan Kai Sentenced
to 1.5 Years’ Imprisonment), Radio Free Asia, 11 August 2006, http://www.rfa.org/
mandarin/shenrubaodao/2006/08/11/huanbao/.
34. Gongan gongzuo zhong guojia mimi ji qi miji juti fanwei de guiding (Regulation on State
Secrets and the Specific Scope of Each Level of Secrets in Public Security Work), adopt-
ed on 28 March 1995 and came into effect on 1 May 1995, art. 2 (A)(7). Full text in
Chinese and English is available in “State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth,” op. cit.
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In recent years, many of China’s civil society
organisations focusing on environmental protection 
have been able to expand their work, due to widespread
concerns on the state of China’s environment 
as result of its rapid economic development.
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The  Limits  of  Current  Reforms
In May 2005, MOCA revealed that a draft amendment of
the Regulations on Registration and Administration of So-
cial Organisations had been submitted to the State Council
for approval, but, as of early September 2007, this amend-
ment has not been made public. According to domestic re-
ports in 2005, the “dual management system” of China’s
civil society organisations, referring to these organisations’
registration requirements with MOCA and oversight by the
sponsoring government departments, would remain un-
changed.((35) To this effect, state publications noted that
“there are no fundamental changes in the draft revision[s]“
or in the sponsor organisation requirement.((36)
At the same time, Chinese authorities have supported lim-
ited reforms to the status of domestic civil society organisa-
tions, with particular emphasis on measures that would en-
courage private donations to China’s CSOs. Reportedly, the
draft amendment relaxes the funding requirements on social
organisations, especially those at the grassroots level. How-
ever, the proposed revised Regulations will continue to dis-
allow membership-based organisations from taking hold in
China. Some news reports also suggest that the planned re-
visions would allow the authorities discretion to register mul-
tiple civil society organisations of the same type in the same
administrative area, so as to allow competition amongst the
different functional CSOs.((37)
Significantly for foreign civil society organisations that work
in China, it is reported that the management of these organ-
isations will form a separate chapter in the revised Regula-
tions. Right now, other than the Interim Regulations on For-
eign Commercial Chambers (1989), there is no specific reg-
ulation or law that regulates the activities of foreign civil so-
ciety organisations in China. All branch offices of MOCA,
therefore, normally take the “three-nos” policy (Sanbu
zhengce “三不政策”)—“no contact, no acknowledgement
and no cancellation” (“Bu jiechu, bu chengren, bu qudi”
“不接触，不承认，不取缔”)—toward foreign civil so-
ciety organisations.((38) Because there is currently no official
recognition of foreign CSOs that work in China, many for-
eign organisations instead register as for-profit businesses
and pay corporate taxes or work under an approved and reg-
istered domestic organisation. The revisions will allow for-
eign organisations that operate in China to register. How-
ever, similar to domestic CSOs, they will fall under the dual
management mechanism for their registration and operation,
meaning that they will also be required to have approved
sponsor organisations.((39)
Shutter ing  of  the Civ il  Soc ietySpace
Due to the registration requirement and intense oversight
from the government, the amount of civil space available to
these organisations remains uneven, arbitrary and depend-
ent on current political circumstances, timing, and the level
of sensitivity of their advocacy issues. Despite President Hu
Jintao’s calls for a harmonious society that “can only be ac-
complished with the participation of the masses”((40) and
seeks to balance the interests between different social groups
by featuring democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sin-
cerity, amity and vitality,((41) various layers of control in China
limit the activities of Chinese civil society organisations.
This obstructs their overall development as a meaningful
venue for participatory and inclusive political dialogue be-
tween diverse sectors of society and the government. The
problem is most acute among marginalised social groups, es-
pecially ethnic minority groups that struggle for greater au-
tonomy rights and minority protection through exercising
their fundamental right of freedom of association.
For example, while there are officially 354,000 CSOs reg-
istered with the Chinese government, there is little informa-
tion on the existence of organisations that advocate ethnic
minority rights.((42) Most minority-related organisations in
China focus on cultural, not political, aspects of minorities,
such as folk dancing or language study. Very few domestic
programmes examine human rights training or political par-
ticipation for ethnic minorities, due to the sensitivity of these
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issues. Instead, organisations that do work with minorities in
China with funding from foreign development agencies and
organisations are often low-key and frame their activities
around the programmatic themes of livelihood, capacity-
building and gender without invoking the language of rights.
This lack of domestic organisations that predominantly focus
their work on minority rights in China prevents civil society
from effectively reflecting and advocating minorities’ con-
cerns at the grassroots level. This contributes to the lack of
real participation of ethnic minorities in the policy-making
structure of the government and undermines the ability of
CSOs to mediate tensions that may arise as result of public
disagreements with government policies.Role  in  China’s  “Harmonious  Soc iety”  
So far, the government’s reaction to the growth in number of
civil society organisations in China has been mixed. On one
hand, it has especially recognised the strengths that such or-
ganisations focusing on poverty alleviation have in reaching
disadvantaged groups more effectively than official pro-
grammes. For example, the government has started to sub-
contract some of its poverty relief work to organisations
through a bidding process in Jiangxi, leading an official with
the Asian Development Bank in Beijing to proclaim, “[This
new procedure] suggests that terms like ‘building a harmo-
nious society’ and ‘government role transformation’ are not
merely rhetoric but are being at least cautiously explored
and pushed ahead.”((43)
At the same time, the government is clearly wary of organi-
sations that stray too far into what it considers politically sen-
sitive issues, especially those that link their work to the inter-
national human rights framework and call for greater politi-
cal plurality and transparency. This is demonstrated by the
fact that when organisations properly affiliate themselves
with a government sponsor and do not engage in overtly po-
Bicyclists between the two characters meaning “the people” in Chengdu:
Civil society is still far from being well established.
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China’s Civil Society: Controls, Limits and Role in a “Harmonious Society” 
litical activities, they are praised for providing crucial assis-
tance in detecting and combating corruption, labour abuses
and violations of environmental laws.((44) However, this offi-
cial assessment could change if organisations begin to adopt
an increasingly rights-oriented approach to their work. For
example, if civic groups start to educate individuals on their
rights and assist them in seeking concrete legal redress, Chi-
nese officials can criticise those organisations for contribut-
ing to a surge in social unrest.((45)
In recent years, China’s concerns about its growing civil so-
ciety have been driven by the prospect of civil society organ-
ising mass movements and what President Hu Jintao has
warned as the possible emergence of another “colour revo-
lution” in China. These fears have underscored increasing
governmental supervision and scrutiny of civil society. In July
2007, Beijing authorities controversially shut down the
widely-read China Development Brief, a non-profit online
and print publication that reported on China’s social devel-
opment. 
Responding to news of the shut down, Reporters Without
Borders commented: “The closure of websites like China
Development Brief shows that the spectre of Chinese cen-
sorship is much broader and affects news about Chinese so-
ciety which is not in the interests of the Communist
Party.”((46) The decision to shut down this publication clearly
demonstrates the vulnerability of any space that foreign or
domestic CSOs are allowed to operate in China. If this
“civil space” operates at the whim of the authorities, then it
is not truly an independent space where processes are trans-
parent and accountable.
Genuine flourishing of civil society organisations in China
not only allows the broader public interest to be reflected in
official decision-making, resulting in more effective policies
that suit local circumstances. It also serves as an important
mediator of societal tension by channelling popular griev-
ances into legal and peaceful forms of protest and seeking re-
dress. Seen in this light, individuals must be given opportu-
nities to participate in the creation of an open and dynamic
civil society without fears of retaliation when their advocacy
crosses the invisible line of what is officially tolerated. While
some CSOs have been able to expand their work in recent
years, particularly in the areas of health and the environ-
ment, even these activists can be arbitrarily caught under
state secrets charges when they cross this invisible line. For
example, in October 2006, Snow Lotus (Xue Lianhua
雪莲花), a student-led HIV/AIDS education group in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, was banned by local
authorities, and its volunteers were subjected to police ha-
rassment, reportedly for exposing a case in which 19 Hepa-
titis-B positive students were expelled from a local school.((47)
Individuals who attempt to organise outside of state control
have been harshly dealt with by the Chinese government. A
notable example is Hu Shigen 胡石根, who helped to es-
tablish the China Freedom and Democracy Party and the
China Free Trade Union, and was charged with counterrev-
olutionary propaganda and organising a counterrevolutionary
group in December 1994. He was sentenced to 20 years’
imprisonment and five years’ subsequent deprivation of po-
litical rights. Hu later received a seven-month sentence re-
duction in December 2005, but his detention was found to
be arbitrary by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Deten-
tion in the same year. Official crackdown on independent
citizen associations limits the options available to Chinese
citizens who seek legitimate ways to protect their interests,
and these types of crackdown serve as a strong warning and
deterrent to other organisers not to advocate similar causes. 
The wave of control and repression that we currently see in
China against its journalists, human rights defenders and pe-
titioners has wider implications on its civil society by in-
stalling a sense of self-censorship and fear of operating—lead-
ing many to question the commitment of the government to
a harmonious society based on diversity and the tolerance of
different voices. Fundamentally, harmony in society cannot
exist without the freedom of opinion and expression, free-
dom of information, and the right to challenge government
authority and seek legal redress—all of which are crucial for
the work of civil society. The Chinese government’s current
method of addressing the symptoms of unrest, rather than
the problems themselves, as seen in its tight regulatory
framework to control the work of civil society organisations,
will only heighten tensions and accumulate grievances.
Therefore, the promotion of a genuine flourishing of an in-
dependent civil society must be central to the building of a
peaceful, genuinely harmonious society in China. •
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